As the European Union seeks to develop its security and defence policy, its parasitic usage of pre-existent military structures and assets continues apace. And when it comes to identifying cross-national structures with military implications in the European context, the obvious target is NATO.
The financial crisis has rather knocked the Commission's global ambitions, and Obama's administration has shown commitment to NATO, but as NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has already pointed out, military spending in Europe continues to dramatically drop, undermining NATO’s capabilities alongside European ability to project power.
Rasmussen has been at the forefront of noting the synergy between the EU's ambitions, and NATO's relevancy problem. As the US elections approach, questions about America's commitment to work-shy Europe could further undermine NATO, and it would be a great political win for Rasmussen to be the man who integrated two global organisations.
As Rasmussen has noted, Europe could pursue 'smart defence', by "…building security for less money by working together…" and, he warns "…As the price of military equipment continues to rise, European states acting alone may struggle to afford high-tech weapons systems."
He urges that "…European nations should work in small clusters to combine their resources and build capabilities that can benefit the alliance as a whole. Here, NATO can act as a matchmaker, bringing nations together to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost, more efficiently, and with less risk."
This is exactly what the Commission in Brussels wants: outside pressure on member states to integrate further, abandoning statehood and undoing military formations that are often steeped in history and national identity. With 21 common nations between NATO and the EU, the opportunities and financial logic to merge operations will soon be hard to ignore, especially from Washington’s viewpoint, tired of European fudging and inaction.
NATO's 2010 Lisbon Summit saw a new Security Concept which took the step of stating that a strong EU is key to Euro-Atlantic security, and as such, it is no surprise to see how the EU is piggy-backing on NATO's hard work, and developing operational experience of its own whilst giving the risk to America.
NATO (largely American forces) intervened in Bosnia with the IFOR force in 1995. It was replaced by SFOR in 1996, which ran until 2004. Who took over operations? The European Union, with its Althea force, aiming to carry on further implementing the Dayton Agreement.
Conflict broke out in Kosovo in 1999, resulting in NATO intervention under the name KFOR. Now that most of the dangerous work is over, and hampered by its own internal divisions regarding recognition of Kosovo as a state, the EU has its EULEX force – the EU Rule of Law mission, deployed in 2008.
And of course there is Afghanistan. In 2003 NATO deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which, amongst other things, helped train police. Sure enough, the EU has followed in NATO's footsteps. In 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan – the European Union police mission – started operations.
One of the greatest signs of integration is in the field of anti-piracy. NATO launched Operation Ocean Shield in 2009 to protect shipping from Somali Pirates. The EU followed suit, sending Operation Atalanta and the EU's NAVFOR (Naval Force) into pirate waters. Both of these operations are commanded and controlled, no doubt using the same systems and structures, at NATO’s base in Northwood, Middlesex.
As such, expect the EU to increase its involvement in Libya, after things have calmed down. For rather than provide pooled funding to contribute to the UK's superior, already existing, defence capabilities, and accept British protection for other EU states, Brussels would far prefer to dismantle national forces and reconstitute them as an EU army, in the process eroding national identities, and building far less efficient, multi-lingual, poorly commanded and controlled, legions for Europe.
