The House of Commons debated, yesterday, the European Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy. During the debate Bill Cash made the following interventions:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt): I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 14613/11, relating to a Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law; agrees that the primary focus of EU criminal law should be tackling serious crime with a cross-border dimension; and further agrees that the general principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and necessity based on clear evidence must be respected when deciding whether to propose criminal sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of EU policies.

I am glad of the opportunity to restate that the Government agree with the European Scrutiny Committee that the focus of European Union criminal law should be combating the most serious cross-border crimes. We also agree that in determining whether criminal law is required across the member states, it is critical that the general principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and necessity are respected.

The consequence of the Lisbon treaty coming into effect on 1 December 2009 is that the use of criminal law provisions is likely to increase, as they will be used to support the implementation of European Union policy in areas in which they have not been used before. However, the limits to that are not set in the communication that we are discussing, which is non-binding. Rather, they have a legal basis in the treaty, namely article 83. Paragraph 2 of that article limits the EU’s power, because it sets out that member states cannot be required to criminalise breaches of EU law unless the strict conditions in article 83 are met, and the United Kingdom opt-in will always apply. We have recently seen the first such proposal, on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation.

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Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con): Bearing in mind that much of what we are considering will be governed in due course by qualified majority vote, any insistence in this House will be subject to the vagaries of that system.

Mr Blunt: Of course, what we are considering is guided by the opt-in principles in the Lisbon treaty under the relevant protocol. The emergency brake, as a final reserve position, then underwrites everything. For example, if we opted in to something at the beginning of negotiations, found ourselves outvoted by a qualified majority vote and the Government then came to a view that what had emerged was unacceptable, the emergency brake would remain available to us to prevent that criminal legislation from applying to us.

(…)

Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con): We have just heard a breathtaking example of complacency from the Government—sorry, I mean the Opposition. I say that because, unfortunately, the manner in which this issue is being approached, and the reason why the European Scrutiny Committee thought this matter should be debated, is very simple. We have heard reservations expressed so far by the Minister and shadow Minister, but they do not take express account of the fact that once a communication has got going—particularly a communication under the aegis of the Lisbon treaty—we effectively open the door to considerable, radical proposals for the expansion of European criminal law.

I am glad the Minister made the comments he made and I endorse all of them. I am also glad he agrees with the Committee on a wide range of matters, particularly the nomenclature and the phrase “Euro crimes”. However, this is a substantial issue. The document that was presented to us by the Commission concludes that

“the new legal framework introduced by the Lisbon treaty … considerably enhances the possibility to progress with the development of a coherent EU Criminal Policy which is based on considerations both of effective enforcement and”—

it claims—

“a solid protection of fundamental rights. This communication represents a first step in the Commission’s efforts to put in place a coherent and consistent EU Criminal Policy by setting out how the EU should use criminal law to ensure the effective implementation of EU policies.”

It could be no clearer than that. That is the intention, and believe me, it is the direction and the line of route.

Other hon. Members will no doubt deal with other matters arising from that, but as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, I want to explain why we insisted that this matter should be debated. The Committee recommended the document for one simple reason: the communication outlines how a supranational organisation intends to pass criminal legislation that will have a direct impact on our citizens. This is indeed a sensitive area, as the enactment of criminal law is traditionally the domain of sovereign legislatures.

In the conclusion to our report, we noted the emphasis in the communication that the Commission places on respecting the general principles of subsidiarity, necessity based on clear evidence, proportionality, including the principle of ultima ratio—in other words, criminal law as a means of last resort—and the legal traditions of the EU member states when deciding whether to propose criminal sanctions to ensure the effective implementation of EU proposals. Those words are welcome, but we wait to see whether they are respected. Evidence to the contrary is abundant in relation to matters of this kind. That is because the manner in which it is proposed to move down the route of criminal law—albeit under the Lisbon treaty, which my party opposed tooth and nail during its enactment—relies heavily on the fact that there is a desire among many people in the European Union to have one country, which, by its very nature, they would prefer to have one European criminal law policy. There is therefore a direct contradiction between the manner in which the proposals are being made and the words used. We argue that we should wait to see whether the suggestions that lie behind the Commission’s statements are respected.

We are gratified by the Government’s reaffirmation that any EU action in the field of criminal law will have to be justified on the basis of robust evidence, as well as demonstrating why lesser administrative penalties are not appropriate. The Committee intends to hold the establishment to strict account on that question. We also support the Government’s cautious approach to the Commission’s communication, but we add further caveats of our own. The European Union should not seek to harmonise the traditional rules on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in member states. The UK does not assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over those who are “habitually resident”—an expression that has found its way into EU criminal legislation—in this country.

The EU should also refrain from defining “mitigating and aggravating circumstances” for the commission of crimes, which is best left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. Furthermore, the expression “Euro crimes”, which is used in the communication for the 10 offences listed under article 83.1 of the treaty, is inappropriate and misleading. We ask the Government to do their utmost—in fact, we would go so far as to insist that they do this—to ensure that the term does not enter the EU’s lexicon. Indeed, I was extremely glad to hear what the Minister had to say about that.

The other point is that although there is the question of opt-ins and whether we are to accept the provisions, we have seen a torrent of opt-ins over the last few months, since this coalition Government came to power, and a significant number of Members of Parliament are deeply concerned about the tendency in that direction. Furthermore, in addition to the opt-ins, there is the emergency brake. We understand all that, but we have to have regard to that tendency, because of what can happen once the door is opened on that scale. In the light of what I said about what is in the mind of the Commission and others in the European Union, and about the tendency to move towards a policy of further integration, which would include criminal law, we should be not merely cautious, but extremely resistant towards any attempt to move further down that route.

Sir Alan Beith: When I was chairing the Justice Committee, I do not remember ever meeting anybody, in any justice committee in any member state, who believed that we should be working towards a single, harmonised criminal law that would replace the criminal law of member states across Europe. Is the hon. Gentleman not conjuring up a spectre?

Mr Cash: Certainly not. I am not conjuring up a spectre; I am talking about a tendency. In almost every area, the original proposals—from Maastricht, through to Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon—have adopted a minimalist approach at the beginning, but then expanded, moving further and deeper into the areas of competence that have been acquired. I am not going to dispute what the right hon. Gentleman says about what he has heard; I am merely referring to what I have observed, which is also understood by many others, including the Government.

Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con): The ambition of the European Commission is set out on page 18 of the documents. Its ambition is not a limited extension of criminal policy; it is to have “an important tool to better fight crime”— that is, any crime. It is not limited.

Mr Cash: I entirely agree. Furthermore, article 83.1 sets out the following areas of crime:

“terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.”

It continues: “On the basis of developments in crime”—

the broader remit under which such an extension is proposed—

“the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph.” Although article 83.1 says that the Council “shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,”

we are talking about a process of opening up and extending those areas of domestic control over criminal jurisdiction that are likely to be transferred to the European domain.

On a final note—and to reply to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), the Chairman of the Liaison Committee—the Committee noted that the third sentence of the communication states: “An EU Criminal Policy should have an overall goal to foster citizens’ confidence in the fact that they live in a Europe of freedom, security and justice”.

I ask the Minister to say whether he agrees with that statement. For our part, we in the Committee think it an example of dangerously ideological thinking. We are concerned that such thinking may inform future proposals from the Commission. Citizens look to their Governments to provide freedom, security and justice in their own states. To expect freedom, security and justice to flow in 27 European states under the auspices of supranational institutions may sound laudable, but in reality it is both implausible and unwarranted. We think that the Commission would have done itself a service by cutting out such a statement from a policy paper of such importance and limiting its ambitions to more practical objectives.

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Mr Cash: I understand that there is obviously a complementarity between the European Scrutiny Committee and departmental Select Committees. It is important, however, to reaffirm the fact that we rarely recommend a communication for debate, but on this occasion, because of the nature and coherence of the proposals advocated by the Commission on criminal policy, we thought it was a good idea at least to give it a kick-start on the Floor of the House.

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Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con): The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) said one very wise and pertinent thing. It was not the only wise and pertinent thing he said, but it was one that struck me, and that was that it is almost invariably the case that it is undesirable to introduce into a mature and well-developed legal system another layer of legislation that is already covered satisfactorily by domestic legislation.

I recall that in the 1990s I had practical experience of such an occasion, when the European Union introduced its own sanctions on Serbia. It introduced a directly applicable regulation in exactly the territory on which this county had already legislated under the United Nations Act 1946. I recall that the case in which I took part challenged the domestic legislative regime on the basis that it occupied territory in which the European Union had legislated and that the two regimes, minutely analysed, could not be seen to be compatible. Not only were they not compatible in their substance, but they were incompatible in the sense that it is well-established case law in the European Court of Justice that any legislative activity by the European Union must take precedence and primacy not only in the substance of its impact and effect but in its appearance. In other words, the legislative authority of any particular action in a member state, once the European Union has legislated, must be seen to emanate from the European Union. To that extent, it is an extremely intolerant legislative authority.

That means that one must examine extremely carefully—I see that the Secretary of State for Justice is doing so as regards the market abuse framework—whether the introduction of European Union law into a sphere that is already occupied by domestic legislation will cause such a complicated unintended consequence. I recall that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at the time was poised with an order to lay before the House in case the Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Appeal accepted the arguments that I and others were advancing. He was ready to go that morning, because of the chaos that would have ensued had the domestic legislation been struck down as incompatible with the European Union’s legislative action.

It is extremely undesirable that that should happen and, having listened to the various balances that have been struck by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who is so often proved, even after many years, to be right, I prefer the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. The Commission has a cavernous maw into which legislation is sucked into a black hole along with our rights, prerogatives and spheres of sovereignty. I am strongly concerned about the consequences for this Government if they continue with their policy of opt-ins, as was observed by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed a few moments ago.

When a country opts in to a sphere of competence of the European Union, it does not opt in merely to a different wording or to some dilute or mild consequence of that kind. It opts in lock, stock and barrel to the hegemony of the European Union institutions, by which I mean the European Court of Justice, the Commission and the rest of it. That might attract complacent smiles on the Opposition Benches—and even on the Government Benches—but just think of what legislative territory is already included. Firearms control—which has not been mentioned so far, but which is covered by a series of European directives—organised crime, VAT, drug trafficking and money laundering are all covered by extensive directives and directly applicable regulations. There is not a Crown court in this country that is not, as we speak, preoccupied with such trials. If we opt in, we are opting in to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and enabling it to examine our procedures in our Crown courts and see whether they comply with the minimum rules that this policy will set down. (…)

Mr Cox: I do agree. The fundamental underlying principle that should exercise all Members of this House when it comes to criminal law powers being assumed by a supranational organisation is that what is or is not criminal, and what is or is not an action that puts an individual citizen of this nation beyond the pale of the criminal law, should be a matter for this House. It is to this House that citizens of this country entrust the moral judgments that underlie decisions about what should be criminalised and what should not. We are directly accountable to that citizenry, whereas the institutions of the European Union are not. That is why I have come to this debate to sound a note of caution and warning. That is also why, having listened to the different expressions of caution that have been so well made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, who chairs the Select Committee on Justice, I prefer the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone.

There is no doubt but that a vast field is already occupied by the European Union, and if we see a panoply of institutional responsibility and jurisdiction introduced into the criminal law, we will be exposing our procedures, our rules of evidence and our very jury trial itself to challenge in the European Court of Justice as not complying with the minimum rules set down. That might not happen this year or the next, but the European Union thinks in terms not just of one decade, but of decades and decades; it proceeds slowly. That is why, like Cassandra, or like Balaam’s ass, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone so often stands in our way—or indeed, like the angel that prevented Balaam’s ass from going on, he beckons to us and indicates that we would do well to think very carefully before we simply approve policies of this kind without understanding that there is an underlying caution that we should always exercise.

(…) Question put and agreed to .

(..) Resolved,

(…)That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 14613/11, relating to a Commission Communication, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law; agrees that the primary focus of EU criminal law should be tackling serious crime with a cross-border dimension; and further agrees that the general principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and necessity based on clear evidence must be respected when deciding whether to propose criminal sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of EU policies.