Margarida Vasconcelos: There is no legally binding and irreversible agreement

The Government’s White Paper, “The best of both worlds”, claims that the new Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union agreed by David Cameron and the other EU leaders at the February’s European Council gives the UK a special status in a reformed EU. However, it would only have a limited impact on the European construction, and it hardly changes the status quo. The changes secured by David Cameron have not reformed the EU, as it has been claimed, and they do not “constitute an appropriate response” to the issues raised by British people. The new settlement main aim was to provide a solution for David Cameron’s reform demands rather than address the British people concerns, while keeping the so called EU’s unity, on the base of compromise solutions, and without jeopardising the EU’s fundamental values such as the freedom of movement and the development of the Economic and Monetary Union. As the real problem lies in the existing treaties, the British people needed a profound change, dealing with the treaties fundamental structure and foundations. However, David Cameron has failed to deliver the fundamental change that has been promised to the British people. In fact, David Cameron has not sought a fundamental change but just some changes in four areas, economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and welfare and free movement. Hence, British voters, in the forthcoming referendum, must be aware that the new settlement does not entail a fundamental change on the UK membership with the EU.

It is important to note that even minor reforms would have required treaty amendments in order to secure a change to the status quo and a legally binding and irreversible effect however most of David Cameron’s reform demands have been dealt within the “existing legal framework” and there is solely a promise to amendment the treaties to address two issues: economic governance and ever closer union. Yet, this will not happen before the referendum takes place, in fact it might not happen at all. The Decision provides that it would take effect on the same date as the Government informs the Secretary-General of the Council that the UK has decided to remain a member of the European Union. But, it remains to be seen whether the deal that the Government has secured would be kept, after the referendum, by the member states and the EU institutions, particularly by the European Court of Justice.

The Government claims that the new settlement is an International Law Decision that is both legally binding and irreversible. We ought therefore to ask whether the changes on the UK membership with the EU, which the Government claims that have been secured are “legally binding and irreversible”.

The new settlement for the UK is a complex document which contains different legal forms, with different legal status, which has been subject to different interpretations that support both sides of the argument. It is set out in eight documents: a Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, a Statement containing a draft Council Decision intended to set up the so called emergency brake for non-Eurozone Member States, a Declaration of the European Council on Competitiveness and four European Commission’s declarations on subsidiarity and burden reduction implementation mechanisms, on child benefits, on the safeguard mechanism on social benefits and on issues related to the abuse of the right of free movement of persons.

First of all, it should be noted that the Decision of the EU Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, on the new settlement is not a decision of the European Council, which is a EU institution, let alone a EU treaty. Hence, it is not part of the EU law, and, consequently it cannot be legally binding under EU law.

The Decision is an instrument of international law, which seems to amount to an international agreement for the purposes of the section 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties yet it is arguable whether it can be called a treaty in the strict sense of the term. The registration in the Treaty Section of the UN Secretariat, which the Government has already submitted, it is indeed a prerequisite for an international agreement to be capable of being invoked before the UN’s organs and the Government is relying on this for showing further evidence of the legally binding character of the agreement under international law.

The depositing of the Decision at the UN is a red herring as this is an international agreement which concerns the autonomous EU legal order, as interpreted by Member State courts and the European Court of Justice. It is ‘legally binding and irreversible’ from the perspective of international law but it is not part of EU law and it is not legally binding on the EU institutions. Moreover, regardless whether the Decision itself is legally binding it contains parts, namely the statement containing a draft Council Decision that will set up the so called emergency brake for non-Eurozone Member States as well as the European Council declaration and the European Commission declarations, which are not legally binding.

The Decision does not provide for any formality requirement for the parties to express their consent to be bound, such as signing or ratification, hence the agreement reached by the Heads of State or Government when they adopt the Decision was the mean by which they agreed to give their consent to be bound by the Decision. As a matter of International law it seems that article 11 of the Vienna convention is fulfilled. But, it is important to note, that although international law does not require any particular ratification procedure for the decision to become biding this must be ascertained by the member states in the light of their constitutional orders, so it is possible that some member states would only considered themselves bound by the Decision after national parliamentary approval. Hence, some Member States might need to pass domestic legislation or to follow some domestic procedures in order to comply with such agreement.

The Government also claims that the decision is irreversible, as it “was agreed by all of the Member States, and cannot be amended or revoked unless all Member States, including the UK, agree.” The Decision itself contains no clause providing for amendment or repeal, although the European Council Conclusions to which it is annexed state that ‘this Decision … may be amended or repealed only by common accord of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union’. In accordance with the Vienna Convention general rules the so called international law Decision, as an international agreement, is not capable of being amended or revoked without the agreement of all the parties, meaning that the UK government has to consent to amend it or repeal it. Hence, it can only be considered irreversible, under international law, in the sense that it cannot be amended or revoked without the UK consent. Consequently, the Government seems to believe that as long as the UK does not agree “to a request to amend or withdraw this decision” it will remain in “place as part of the foundation of our membership of the reformed EU.”

The Decision cannot be reversed without the UK government agreement but that does not mean that it is irreversible. In fact, what is the point of having the so called international law decision, legally binding and irreversible, under international law, if then the Government cannot guarantee its outcome or enforce it? The fact that the Decision is legally binding and irreversible under international law it does not mean that the other EU member states and the European Commission will institute the various changes after the referendum takes place and that it is not open to challenge in national courts and in the ECJ. It should be noted that unlike the Danish and Irish Decisions, the UK’s new settlement does not apply just to the UK but to all Member States which makes it more susceptible for being hindered by other Member States’ national parliaments and challenges in national courts, as to whether the Decision, or the procedure followed, conflict with the EU Treaties or with their constitutions or national laws. In the other hand, any future government or parliament might decide not to honour a commitment made by a predecessor and there is no enforcement mechanism to make sure they do. International law does not offer enforcement mechanisms as EU law and domestic law, as it is mostly done through diplomatic route. The Decision is therefore not enforceable under EU law. The EU institutions are not parties to the Decision, which, consequently, does not legally bind them. Hence, there is no insurance that the EU institutions will comply with the new settlement, which is, in fact, vulnerable of being struck down by the ECJ after the referendum takes place.

It is impossible to predict the practical effect of the agreement, as the Decision is far from being free from uncertainties. There are no legal guarantees that all the results foreseen in the new settlement will be achieved and there is no way to enforce them. It is important to recall that the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter on the interpretation and validity of EU law, and it is not bound to follow the interpretations agreed in the Decision, thus there is no guarantee it would accept them or if it will accept the EU secondary legislation that has been promised to address issues concerning the EU free movement and social benefits rules as compatible with the Treaties. There is also the possibility of the Court finding some parts of the Decision incompatible with the EU treaties, and, consequently, it can be reversed by it. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the European Parliament will approve such legislation, as it is not bound by the Decision. The commitment to amend the EU treaties envisaged in the Decision is another substantial caveat, as it is subject to Member States’ constitutional requirements, including ratification and referenda in some member states.

As the Government recalls, the EU has indeed accommodated the Danish and Irish requirements over Maastricht and Lisbon respectively through Decisions adopted by the Member States Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, which were registered with the UN Secretariat as treaties in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter. The 1992 Edinburgh Agreement Decision was then incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2008 Irish Decision was included into a Protocol, attached to the Croatia’s accession Treaty. In both cases, the EU leaders adopted a decision on the meaning of the Treaty, deciding that it had no effect on certain aspects of those countries national law. It was emphasised that they were interpretative decisions, fully compatible with the Treaties, whose main purpose was to clarify but not to amend the Treaties. In fact, those Decisions have not changed the substantive nature of the treaty itself and they did not change in substance those countries obligations under the treaties, as they just clarified their implications and limitations regarding particular issues relevant to the Danish and Irish people respectively. The EU leaders particularly stressed that the relationship between the EU and its Member States would not be changed by the Irish Protocol since its “sole purpose (…) will be to give full Treaty status to the clarifications set out in the Decision to meet the concerns of the Irish people.”

The European Council Conclusions state that “the content of the Decision is fully compatible with the Treaties” and the Decision on the UK’s new settlement itself also states “Desiring to settle, in conformity with the Treaties, certain issues raised by the United Kingdom”. It is also important to stress that the Decision also respects “the powers of the institutions of the Union, including throughout the legislative and budgetary procedures, and not affecting the relations of the Union institutions and bodies with the national competent authorities”. This makes clear that have been no changes to the EU’s legislative and budgetary powers as well as to the powers of the EU’s institutions which remain unaffected whilst these are issues that shall have been tackled during the negotiations as the ordinary legislative procedure represents a fatal invasion of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament and the EU institutions claim ultimate jurisdiction over UK law-making.

The EU leaders did not want to amend the treaties before the referendum, so, following Denmark and Ireland examples, they agreed on a mere interpretative agreement that just provides further clarification on interpretation of existing commitments and outlines future policy. The Decision specifically states that is “Intending to clarify (…) certain questions of particular importance to the Member States so that such clarification will have to be taken into consideration as being an instrument for the interpretation of the Treaties;” The so called International Law Decision agrees on how the EU Treaties should be interpreted in the future, as it contains several provisions that reflect an agreement between Member States about the meaning of the EU Treaties. The UK’s new settlement is not intended to change the treaties but to clarify or supplement them, which falls within the scope of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Regardless whether the EU member states are obliged under international law to interpret the treaties in line with the Decision, the EU institutions are not bound by it. The EU institutions are at most required to take such clarifications into account when interpreting the treaties. The European Court of Justice has indeed indicated in the Rottmann case, concerning the Edinburgh Agreement, that the interpretative decisions of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council “have to be taken into consideration as being instruments for the interpretation of the EC Treaty” but then it decided in a way clearly contrary to that agreement. The Edinburgh Agreement stated that ‘whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned’ but the Court held “Nevertheless, the fact that a matter falls within the competence of the Member States does not alter the fact that, in situations covered by European Union law, the national rules concerned must have due regard to the latter”. The ECJ has not considered itself bound by the Edinburgh Decision and by a Declaration to the Treaties which stated that issues concerning the acquisition and loss of nationality shall be settled by reference to member states’s national law, as it held that such decisions must be taken in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The Danish agreement was registered at the UN, but this did not stop the ECJ to overruled it.

The Court might take the interpretations set up in the Decision into account when interpreting the Treaties in the future but it is not obliged to follow and apply them. In fact, the Court is most likely of not considering itself bound by the Decision, even where the interpretation agreed it is not contra legem. Obviously, the Court wont interpret the Treaties in line with Decision if it finds it to be in conflict with EU law. Against what the Government said, the Decision has no force before the Court.

There are therefore serious issues on the enforceability of the new settlement. The Court of Justice has held that acts adopted by representatives of the Member States acting not in their capacity as members of the Council but as representatives of their governments are not subject to judicial review. Hence, the Decision on the new settlement is not justiciable because the European Court of Justice has no competence to rule on the compliance of the agreement. Moreover, the Decision does not contain any mechanism to enforce it, as it solely provides that “Any Member State may ask the President of the European Council that an issue relating to the application of this Decision be discussed in the European Council.” Hence, if there is any dispute about its interpretation or application, any member state can refer the matter to the European Council. The Decision does not constitute EU law but under Article 273 of the TFEU Member States are allowed to give powers to the ECJ to settle disputes between them in a special agreement relating to the subject-matter of the EU Treaties. But, the EU leaders have not ensure the enforceability of the Decision by giving the Court of Justice jurisdiction to verify whether they comply with their obligations under it. Nonetheless, the Court would have protected the unity of EU law and would have required the application of the UK’s new settlement to be fully compatible with existing EU law.

The Decision might be legally binding under international law, but this does not make it enforceable under either EU or domestic law. Hence, there is nothing the Government can do to enforce this deal, which further shows its vulnerability.

As above-mentioned, the preamble of the Decision as well as the European Council Conclusions state that “the content of the Decision is fully compatible with the Treaties” however it can be incompatible with the Treaties even if it was not intended by the parties. The European Court of Justice has no competence to rule on the compliance of the agreement, but it has competence to consider any potential conflict with the EU treaties. The Decision is not part of EU law hence its validity cannot be challenged directly before the Court but it can be challenged in a national court. The ECJ might come across the UK’s new settlement while ask by a national court, through the preliminary ruling procedure, to interpret treaty provisions in areas covered by it. This can be particular relevant when the Decision on the new settlement envisages EU secondary legislation, as the Court is likely to be asked to consider whether such legislation is compatible with the EU Treaties.

It is also important to note that the UK courts, under the ECA 1972, are bound by the EU Treaties and by the ECJ rulings hence, in case of conflict, they cannot enforce the Decision as they are required to set aside any conflicting measure and give primacy to the EU treaties and their interpretation by the Court of Justice. As the ECJ has confirmed the principle of primacy of EU law over international agreements, any agreements concluded between the Member States are to be set aside by national courts when conflicting with EU law. Hence, in case of conflict the EU law takes precedence over the renegotiation Decision. The Decision’s provisions would have to be incorporated into the Treaties to be enforced by the ECJ.

In the other hand, it must be stressed that these decisions of the Heads of State and government cannot modify the Treaties, as the ECJ in 1976, in the Defrenne II case, has ruled that the Treaty could only be amended by means of the amendment procedure provided within it. Hence, the mechanisms for amendment contained in Article 48 TEU, the ordinary and the simplified revision procedures, are the sole mechanisms by which the EU Treaties can be amended. The ECJ would not recognise as valid any attempt to amend the Treaties, other than by means of the procedures contained in article 48 TEU. The Decision on the new settlement, as an international law decision, cannot amend the EU Treaties. In fact, this was not the intention of the EU leaders, as they specifically stated it. However, the distinction between interpreting and amending a treaty is not black and white and one could argue that an interpretation that is incompatible with the Treaties would amount to an amendment which consequently would require the procedures in Article 48 TEU to be followed. In fact, according to Jean Claude Piris, Former Director General of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, any promise to amend the Treaties that is legally binding transforms such a promise into a Treaty, which must be done in conformity with Article 48 TEU. Although it is unlikely, there is the possibility of the ECJ finding that the Decision affects the internal legal order of the EU by amending the EU Treaties, and should thus have gone through the mechanisms provide in Article 48 TFEU.

The UK new settlement contains indeed a commitment that “the Member States will at the next opportunity, and subject to compliance with their respective constitutional requirements and the procedures in the EU Treaties, amend the EU Treaties to address key UK concerns.” The agreement to seek Treaty change obviously is not equivalent to Treaty change, and, consequently is not in that sense binding and irreversible as would be an actual change to the Treaties. Such commitment might be biding under international law but as far as EU law is concern it is a political rather than a legally-binding commitment. It is important to recall that in December 2010 the European Council agreed that the European Financial Stability Mechanism from 2013 would no longer be available to support Eurozone Member States, yet it was used last summer to support Greece. Although guarantees to protect non-Eurozone states were introduced, this clearly shows that political commitments cannot be secured.

The Decision commits the EU member states to incorporate language on the meaning of ‘ever closer union’ and on the principles defining the relationship between non and Eurozone member states into the EU treaties. It contains two provisions, which state “The substance of this Section will be incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties and the respective constitutional requirements of the Member States.” These provisions do not provide an exact text and terms of a proposed amendment but specifically refer to the “substance of”. As there is no proposal on their future drafting or content, which would amount to amendments to the treaties, is far for certain that the treaties would be amended in a way that addresses the UK’s concerns. Yet, there is no legal certainty that those treaty amendments would definitely be approved.

The EU member states governments are under no obligation to amend the treaties as they just committed to take steps to agree treaty changes when possible. If there is a change of government in a Member State, the new government might not feel bound by the commitment of its predecessors and refuses to accept the treaty changes. It is also possible that during the treaty amendments negotiations one or more member states is against the amendments to address the UK concerns or may be unable to ratify them. The Decision makes clear that it is subject to the procedures contained within the EU Treaties and the constitutional requirements of Member States, which require further approval from national parliaments and in some cases may involve holding national referenda, so the outcome is highly unpredictable. Obviously, the member states cannot change the treaties if this is not permitted by their constitutional requirements, namely if the amendments are rejected in a referendum, or a Member State’s parliament does not agree to ratify them. Thus, there is no legally binding and irreversible agreement to amend the treaties, as there are substantial caveats regarding the need to comply with the treaty procedures and with member states’s constitutional arrangements.

Moreover, as it happened in the Irish Protocol, the envisaged treaty changes are merely intended to give full treaty status to the clarifications set out in the Decision to meet the concerns raised by David Cameron, and they will not alter the UK relationship with the EU. Nonetheless, the incorporation of the Decision provisions into the treaties or a protocol to be attached to the EU Treaties and ratified by all member states, would give them the status of primary law and then they would bind the EU institutions and would be enforceable by the Court of Justice. Nonetheless, until this happens there is no insurance that the renegotiation package that has been agreed will be complied with by the EU institutions and other member states.

It is important to note that might not be any treaty change in the foreseeable future. The other EU member states have already shown they unwillingness to re-opened the treaties just to accommodate the UK’s concerns, there is no impending EU accession, and, according to the five presidents report there would not be a treaty change before 2025. Hence, it can take years and years, after the referendum, to decide the treaty amendments, particularly if the ordinary revision procedure is triggered. Under the so called ordinary revision procedure any member state or an EU institution may put forward a proposal for treaty amendment. The European Council must then consult with the European Parliament and Council to decide whether to discuss the proposal. This procedure requires a ‘Convention’ to be called, consisting of representatives of national parliaments, Member State governments, the European Parliament and the Commission, which would then recommend treaty amendments. The European Council may decide by a simple majority that treaty amendments should be decided directly by an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) if the nature of the revision does not justify the setting-up of a cumbersome Convention. But this is subject to the consent of the European Parliament. The proposed amendments must be agreed by ‘common accord’ in the IGC of Member State representatives and ratified by all Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’. Under the simplified revision procedure there is no Convention and there is no IGC but discussions within the European Council framework. A Decision to amend the treaties can be adopted by the ‘European Council’ acting unanimously, which would then has to be ‘approved by all Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’. This procedure can only be used to amendment provisions of part of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Hence, the amendment concern the ever closer union cannot be adopted by this procedure just the issues concerning the economic governance.

The Decision of the Heads of State and Government also provides for changes through EU secondary legislation, namely by amending the Regulation on the co-ordination of social security systems to introduce changes to child benefits rules and the Directive on freedom of movement of workers to introduce the so called emergency brake on access to in-work benefits. The changes to free movement law via secondary legislation entail further caveats.

The Decision commits the European Commission to put forward legislative proposals to amend the above-mentioned existing legislation after, and if, the Government informs the Secretary-General of the Council that the UK has decided to remain a member of the European Union. Hence, there won’t be draft proposals, implementing the renegotiation outcome, before the referendum let alone adopted legislation. The Commission has been involved in the negotiations and made declarations on its intentions to put forward proposals. However, these declarations are not legally binding and the European Commission is not bound by the Decision. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the Commission fulfills its commitments. The Commission is most likely to put forward legislative proposals but, it is important to note, even if it does there is no guarantee such proposals would fully address the UK’s concerns. Moreover, any proposal to amend EU legislation will be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and QMV. It will require the support of a qualified majority of member states in the Council and a simple majority in the European Parliament to enter into force.

The EU Heads of State and Government made a political commitment that the member states, acting as members of the Council, “will proceed with work on these legislative proposals as a matter of priority and do all within their power to ensure their rapid adoption.” It is arguable whether the Decision is capable of binding the Council, nevertheless the ordinary legislative procedure also involves the European Parliament, which has the power to override a decision taken by the Council. The European Parliament is likely to consider any proposal intended to limit access to social benefits as a restriction to free movement. It is far from certain that the MEPs will give their support to the proposals implementing the renegotiation deal. There are no guarantees that the European Commission let alone the European Parliament will respect the terms of the renegotiation deal and will cooperate with the Council so that the proposals can be adopted smoothly. Hence, the Government would not be able to get the European Commission, the other Member States, and the European Parliament to agree to a satisfactory change to the EU secondary law. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the European Court of Justice will uphold the proposed legislation as lawful. The ECJ, as the final arbiter in matters of EU law, would have the last word over the legality of the proposed measures. The measures implementing the renegotiation deal might be challenged in national courts, particularly the emergency brake, which will then refer the matter, through the preliminary ruling procedure, to the ECJ. Obviously, the measures will be struck down by the Court, if it finds that they breach the Treaties, namely Article 45 TFEU on free movement or violate the general principle of non-discrimination. Hence, there is no guarantee that the secondary legislation envisaged in the Decision will be proposed, adopted and not declared void by the ECJ. Consequently, they cannot be described as “legally binding and irreversible” as the Decision on the new settlement does not bind the EU institutions, and they must be involved in the legislative procedure.

The Decision also supplements the Treaties by governing how Member States will conduct themselves as Members of the Council in certain situations. There is a political commitment to adopt, if British people vote to stay in the EU, the Draft Council Decision intended to establish the so called emergency brake for non-Eurozone member states. This measure can indeed be adopted by the Council itself and it does not need to be proposed by the Commission, or agreed by the European Parliament. Hence, if adopted will be biding in EU law. The Council is most certain to adopt the draft decision but, it is important to note, that there is no mechanism, under EU law, that forces it to adopt it. Moreover, it seems that the emergency brake lacks enforceability, as the Government is most likely of not being successful in challenging the adoption of a measure where the Council has ignored the emergency brake. Under Article 263 TFEU the ECJ has jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the EU institutions on grounds of infringement of an essential procedural requirement, but it is unlikely of declaring a measure void, as it wont considered the emergency brake, which is not provided in the treaties, as an infringement of such procedural requirements. Nevertheless, regardless whether the political commitment to set up a emergency brake is legally binding and irreversible it should be stressed that it does not entail a veto power, which, in fact, is expressly excluded.

The Decision also contains rules on the so called “red card” procedure and commits the member states, while acting as Council members, to discontinue discussion of a draft legislative proposal and refrain from voting on it, if national parliaments have shown a red card, challenging its compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. However, these are not legally binding requirements as they are not foreseen in existing EU Law. The Council is not obliged under the Treaties to adopt a given proposal but if the Council decides to adopt it, in defiance of the red card procedure, this won’t be ground for annulment of the measure under Article 263 TFEU. The ECJ would not declare an EU act void because a red card was not observed, if this is not provided in the treaties. Nevertheless, regardless whether the political commitment to set up a red card is legally binding and irreversible it is important to stress that it would not entail a unilateral but collective veto. Consequently, if Westminster, individually, wants to veto EU legislation, on its own national interest, won’t be able to do so.

It is important to recall that the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons in March 2015, “In the coming two years, we have the opportunity to reform the EU and fundamentally change Britain’s relationship with it.” The Government is claiming that it has ensured a “substantial, legally-binding, irreversible change in our membership of the EU across the 4 areas raised by the Prime Minister at the outset of this negotiation.” However, the changes that David Cameron claims to have secured are mainly cosmetic and fail to change anything substantial. The new settlement has failed to tackle any issues with the Britain’s EU membership, as the Government has failed to regain a single power from Brussels. This new settlement has failed to give back to the UK’s parliament the ability to decide on important issues that affect national life and to ensure that the UK courts are the ultimate arbiter of our national law. It has failed to ensure freedom of choice at the ballot box for people to have their own laws. The renegotiation has failed to restore the UK sovereignty that has been ceded to the EU. David Cameron has therefore failed to deliver a “substantive change” let alone the fundamental change that has been promised. A fundamental renegotiation of the UK’s EU relationship would have addressed the assertion of the EU institutions that they have ultimate jurisdiction over UK law-making, it would have rejected the Qualified Majority Voting and the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, which represent a fatal invasion of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, it would get rid of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, giving back to the country the right to legislate for and govern the British people through the authority of the Westminster Parliament. However, this has not been reached, in fact, it has not even pursued.

Not only the renegotiation package has failed to deliver a fundamental change it has also failed to deliver significant treaty changes, as it mainly entails clarifications and supplements the existing treaties in the four areas raised by the Prime Minister. Yet, the voters cannot rely on the so called “legally binding and irreversible” decision. There is no certainty that the promises made in the negotiations will be delivered to the British people. Voters in the forthcoming referendum must be aware that no Treaty amendments will be made before the referendum and that the limited changes that have been negotiated might not be delivered.

Against to what the Government has said, this new settlement does not give more influence but the UK will continue to be absorbed into the EU integration process but as a second tier member of a two-tier Europe. This is not in the British interests, as we will remain subject to the existing treaties while being in a second tier with limited or no say. Voters must be aware that if they vote to remain in the EU there will be less influence and more loss of essential national sovereignty. By leaving, and having a trade and political cooperation arrangement with the EU, we will be able to repatriate our democracy and reaffirm our parliamentary sovereignty. If British voters want to control matters that affect them and to be able to govern themselves by their own consent in general elections they should vote leave.