The European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) was planned to be the formal owner of the Community’s satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo) as well as the regulatory authority to supervise the private sector concessionaire that was expected to manage and finance the deployment phase of the programmes. However, it is well known that the public private partnership negotiations collapsed and Brussels agreed to fund the deployment phase of Galileo entirely from the Community budget which means that EU taxpayers will pay a bill of €3.4 billion.

The European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 683/2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation programmes which defines the new framework for the public governance and financing of the programmes. It makes the European Community the owner of all assets created or developed under the programmes. The Regulation has granted to the Commission responsibility for the management of the programmes and sets out the tasks given to the Authority. It provides that the Authority must act while respecting the “Commission’s role as manager of the programmes” and “in accordance with guidelines issued by the Commission.” According to the Regulation the GSA is responsible for the technical certification, security accreditation, operation of the Galileo security centre as well as the market preparation and commercialisation of Galileo.

The European Commission proposed in March 2009 a draft Regulation amending Council Regulation 1321/2004 which established a Community agency, called the European GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) Supervisory Authority. The purpose of the draft proposal is to bring certain provisions of Regulation 1321/2004 into line with those of Regulation 683/2008 which introduced substantive changes as regards the financial, governance and procurement procedures of the Galileo programme, adapting, in this way, the agency’s functions and mission to the new management framework. The proposal would increase the Commission influence in this area as well as its powers within the Authority’s internal organisation.

Whereas all Member States support the general objective of the proposal and stressed the need to address the inconsistencies between the two regulations as soon as possible, several Member States, including the UK, were not pleased with the Commission’s proposal. Last June, the Transport Council debated the adaptation of the management structures of Galileo but no political agreement was reached on the draft regulation. However, on 17 December, the Transport Council reached a general approach on the proposal.

The regulation makes reference to the creation of a Community agency. Since this agency would see reduced its sphere of activity, it would no longer be called the “European GNSS Supervisory Authority”, but rather the “GNSS Agency.” The Agency will be a body of the Community with legal personality. The bodies of the Agency will be the Administrative Board, the Security Accreditation Committee for European GNSS systems and the Executive Director and they would be required to accomplish their tasks in accordance with the guidelines given by the Commission. The Agency would be managed by its Executive Director under the supervision of the Administrative Board.

Under the Commission’s proposal the Administrative Board would be composed of one representative appointed by each Member State and one representative appointed by the Commission. Moreover, each Member State’s representative would have one vote whereas the member representing the Commission would have a “vote equal to that of the total votes of representatives of the Member States.” Obviously, such proposal would give the Commission greater influence in the board of directors of the Agency whilst removing Member States’ control.

Under the original proposal the Commission would have had 50% of the vote and therefore an ‘outright veto’. Several Member States would support giving more power to the Commission than just one vote but they deemed this to be going too far. Unsurprisingly, the Commission wanted to keep its proposal arguing that “only such a voting weight would be compatible with its new responsibilities regarding the governance of the programmes (…).”

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport, Paul Clark, has said to the European Scrutiny Committee that the Commission is now willing to accept a revised structure which would give the vote of its representative a weight of 30% but it asked for an “‘outright veto’ on the appointment of the Executive Director, adoption of the work programme each year, duties in relation to the Agency’s budget, oversight of the operation of the Galileo Security Centre, the ability to exercise disciplinary authority over the Executive Director, special provisions for the right of access to the documents of the Agency, adoption of the Annual Report and adoption of the rules of procedure.” Obviously, the majority of the member states were reluctant to give the Commission both 30% of the vote and such veto rights. The Government was, particularly, against the Commission having veto rights, however as it obtained concessions as regards the Security Accreditation Committee it felt compelled to accept a compromise.

The Council has agreed that the Commission would have five representatives on the Agency’s Administrative Board whereas each member state would have one representative. Each representative of the Member States and of the Commission would have one vote however decisions regarding the work programme of the Agency and the exercise of disciplinary authority over the Executive Director cannot be adopted without the assent of the representatives of the Commission.

The agency would assume the responsibility for providing security accreditations. Hence, it will be set up, within the agency, a committee for European GNSS systems’ security accreditations. The committee would initiate and monitor the implementation of security procedures and perform security audits on European GNSS systems. The security accreditation committee would have ultimate responsibility for deciding whether the risks related to the Galileo system are acceptable.

Under the new division of tasks in the Galileo programme, the Commission will manage all aspects relating to system security hence the Commission believes that “it is essential for the Committee’s activities to be strictly limited to the security accreditation of systems and that under no circumstances should they replace the Commission’s activities.” Moreover, the Commission stressed that the accreditation activities should be coordinated with the work of authorities responsible for managing the programmes thus it has proposed for the security accreditation committee for European GNSS systems to be chaired by a non-voting Commission’s representative. In this way, the Commission would also be in charge of supervising the security accreditation.

The majority of the Member States do not support such proposal suggesting that the chairman should be appointed by the committee. Hence, according to the Council general approach the Committee would appoint its chairperson.

The Government has been concerned with the security accreditation provisions in the draft Regulation, particularly with ensuring the independence of the Security Accreditation Committee. The original text was clarified in order to ensure that the accreditation activities would be carried out independently of the authorities responsible for managing the programmes, particularly the Commission, the other bodies of the Agency and ESA. The Member states agreed that the Security Accreditation Committee for European GNSS systems should be, within the Agency, an autonomous body, taking its decisions independently.

The Committee would, therefore, take "security accreditation decisions" such as the approval of the security accreditation strategy and of satellite launches, the authorisation to operate the systems, the authorisation to operate the ground stations and the authorisation to manufacture the receivers containing PRS technology and their components.

Member States would be required to provide this committee with any useful documentation. The Member States shall also authorise staff appointed by the committee to have access to access to classified information and to any areas affecting the security of systems situated in their territory.

The Commission also proposed that the European Parliament to be represented on the Agency’s Administrative Board as an observer. However, all Member States are reluctant to accept such proposal. Member States pointed out that the European Parliament already has supervision of the Galileo programmes as it participates in the Galileo Interinstitutional Monitoring Panel. Moreover, Regulation 683/08 provides that the European Parliament will get regular reports from the Commission. Member States are aware that in order to fulfil its obligations as an arm of the Community’s budgetary authority, the European Parliament needs to receive full and accurate information on Galileo but they believe that there is no need for its involvement in the Administrative Board. However, the European Parliament has been arguing that the information that it receives from the Galileo Inter-institutional Monitoring Panel is not substantial. This would be, therefore, an issue during the negotiations with the European Parliament.

The proposal goes through the co-decision procedure with QMV required at the Council. It remains to be seen what will come out from the negotiations. The European Parliament is expected to adopt its position at first-reading in April 2010.