On 18 May, the European Court of Auditors published a Special Report on the Commission's management of Non-State Actors' involvement in EC Development Cooperation. The term non-state actors (NSAs) is used in the report as a synonym of civil society organisations including: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, business or professional associations, universities, trade unions, chambers of commerce as well as churches or faith groups.
EU legislation provides for non-state actors to be involved in development cooperation, particularly participating in policy dialogue and implementing development programmes and projects. The EC policy envisages support for capacity development to help NSAs to fulfil these roles.
In 2007 the development funds directly attributed to NSAs were around 915 million euro, 10 % of the total aid to developing countries.
The Court's audit addressed the management of NSAs’ involvement in development cooperation by the European Commission. The audit work was carried out on visits to European Commission delegations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Peru and South Africa.
According to the Court the Commission does not adequately ensure that NSAs are involved effectively in the development cooperation process. The Commission has tried, through its delegations, to involve NSAs in the preparation of country strategies however despite the EU legislation and the Commission’s own guidelines envisage sustained and structured dialogue in many cases the involvement has been limited to one-day seminars.
It is EC policy to consult with NSAs however the Court found little evidence of NSA involvement in the preparation of the 2002-2006 country strategy papers (CSPs) due to lack of adequate records at Commission Delegations. The involvement of NSAs in the development process was therefore limited to the definition of the overall strategy and did not include, as prescribed by the Commission guidelines, “consultation on sectoral strategies and involvement of NSAs in project implementation, monitoring and evaluation in each area of development.” The Court stressed that “For many Delegation staff, NSA involvement is mostly limited to service delivery or to “one-shot” consultations at certain moments of the programming cycle.” According to the Court the Commission has not yet dedicated enough time and resources in order to ensure that Delegation staff really engage with NSAs at all levels.
Moreover, in general, the Commission’s management systems ensure that projects implemented by NSAs are appropriate and are expected to produce the planned results. The standard selection procedure has been made by means of calls for proposals. In general, the calls for proposals audited have led to the selection of relevant projects however according to the Court the average time between the submission of proposals and the actual signing of contracts for the projects audited was more than a year.
The Court also found problems with project design. According to the Court “For several of the projects audited, insufficient preparation for the formulation of activities meant that the first year of the projects had to be devoted to project design” which has reduced “the time available for effective implementation, making the project more vulnerable to delays, and worsening the prospects for sustainability.” Therefore, the call for proposals procedure does not guarantee timely completion of project design.
Moreover, according to the Court, the methods used to advertise the calls for proposals, such as internet and newspapers do not always reach relevant NSAs at grass-roots level.
The audit also intended to determine if the Commission’s control and supervision procedures ensure a smooth implementation of NSA project activities. According to the Court several aspects of the control and supervision procedures have operated correctly but there were some specific problems which lead to errors.
NSAs do not have enough guidance on the practical application of the EC’s financial and contractual rules. The Court pointed out that there are training courses held in the Delegations for both staff and beneficiaries to improve knowledge however such training “consists only of one-day workshops after the conclusion of the calls for proposals” which is not sufficient to ensure that the NSAs have the required knowledge to apply the rules correctly in the course of a project implementation period.
The Court also pointed out that the changes to the Practical Guide and contract conditions have not always been communicated to the grantees. Moreover, there have been inconsistencies in the interpretation of the rules, which led to unnecessary administrative burdens on NSAs.
The Court considered that “There is insufficient monitoring, and prospects for sustainability are poor partly because of the short project duration.”
In order to properly monitor the projects the Commission Delegations should have made regular and direct contacts with the NSA partners. The audit examined to what extent the Commission carried out on-site inspections of projects. The Court deemed that the level of on-site controls was insufficient. There is a lack of on-site support from the Delegations.
According to the Court the capacity-development programmes are relevant but they have not reached their full potential. The Court found two approaches: strategies have been developed and programmes created for capacity development of NSAs, financed by the EU, in most of the ACP countries. However, strategies have not yet been developed for Asian and Latin American beneficiary countries. Whereas geographic programmes are used in the ACP countries, capacity-development support in ALA countries continues to be funded by the thematic programmes. According to the Court this is contrary to the principle stated in the Regulation 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation under which geographic programmes should be used whenever possible.
